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Abstract This paper studies equilibrium merging behavior in composite good indus-
tries. Component producers face the option to either merge with a similar component
producer (horizontal merger) or a complementary one (vertical merger) of a com-
posite good. Focusing only on strategic reasons, vertical mergers arise at equilibrium
only when composite goods are very differentiated or when the number of producers
is large while horizontal mergers arise otherwise. When efficiencies are considered,
higher marginal cost savings are required for a horizontal merger in a composite
industry not to result in a price increase as compared with those required for a regular
industry. This finding can be used by antitrust authorities to be more demanding when
dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods industries.
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1 Introduction
Consumers derive utility from consumption of different sort of goods, some of them
are consumed separately and others used in combinations instead. There are combi-
nations in which individual components provide utility as well, such as a flight and a
hotel booking; while in others utility is only derived when both components are used
simultaneously, such as mobile phones and mobile phone services,1 hardware and
software, printers and ink cartridges or an e-book file and a device to read it. Indus-
tries involved in those products are significant for developed economies. For example
the mobile phones market valued at Retail Selling Price is worth 16,702 millions of
dollars in North America and 37,765 millions of dollars in Western Europe in 2011.
Consumer expenditure on telecommunications services is about 247,855 millions of
dollars in North America and 242,323 millions of dollars in Western Europe in 2012.2
Industries developing those products are typically concentrated and firms are in con-
stant search for increased profitability. Then, several interesting questions raise: Is it
more profitable for a component producer to merge with a substitute or with a comple-
ment component producer? What will authorities do? What’s the role of efficiencies
in these scenarios?
Note that thefirst question above is interesting and also pertinent. The secondmerger
in deal value importance in 2012 was between Starburst II Inc (dependent from the
Japanese firm Softbank Corp, the acquirer) and Sprint Nextel Corporation (the target)
and amounted to 36,956 millions of dollars.3 Both firms offer wireless networks and
mobile communication services. The proposed merger is therefore between substitute
component producers, while Starburst II Inc had potentially the option to merge with a
mobile phone producer such as the Japanese firm Kyocera, that is, with a complement
component producer. Thus, it is relevant to understand which are the reasons behind
the Starburst decision.
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the equilibrium merging behavior in
composite good industries, that is when firms face the option to either merge with a
competitor that is producing a similar component (same type) or a complementary
component (different type) of a composite good. The first type of merger will be
denoted horizontal merger, while the second one vertical merger.4 Mergers are use-
ful devices to restructure industries5 and one of the most scrutinized firms’ decisions
by competition authorities. During 2012 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
1 In Spain it is common to choose a mobile phone and a network according to an offer, this combination
of device and network is unique, but there are other offers with different devices, or different networks.
2 Data from Passport GMID by Euromonitor.
3 Data from Zephyr Annual M&A Report 2012, published by BvD.
4 Vertical mergers entail expanding forward or backward in the chain of distribution, toward the source of
raw materials or toward the ultimate consumer. In our case such a vertical relation does not exist, however
we will keep the label “vertical” for the sake of exposition.
5 The number of mergers and acquisitions in 2012 reached 19,600 in Western Europe and 14,800 in the
US and Canada. While these figures corresponding to 2013 are 21,700 and 14,500 respectively. Despite the
worldwide economic crisis, the number of deals is still relevant (Zephyr Annual M&A Reports 2012 and
2013, published by BvD).
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actively used litigation to block proposed mergers and unwind allegedly anticompeti-
tive consummated mergers, for instance in December 2012 the FTC filed a complaint
seeking to deter Integrated Device Technology’s acquisition of PLX Technology in the
hardware industry. Similarly, the recent Department Of Justice (DOJ)’s challenge to
the Anheuser-Busch InBev/Grupo Modelo transaction in the beer industry. Regarding
the European Commission (EC), over the past three years, the rate at which notified
mergers initiate a Phase II investigation has almost tripled, from 1.19% in 2010 to
3.53% in 2012. Finally, 2012 witnessed the third (UPS’s acquisition of TNT Express)
fourth (the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair) and fifth (the merger between
Deutsche Börse and NYSE) merger prohibition since 2007.
However, while verticalmergers are pleasantly received, horizontal ones are usually
considered harmful for consumers and society.6 Thus our second purpose in the paper
is to provide some analysis that might be useful for competition authorities to better
understand the effects of horizontal mergers in composite good industries. In doing
so, we will draw comparisons on the variation between post and pre merger prices in
relative terms resulting from a horizontal merger in a composite industry and the one
in a regular industry. Also on how synergies resulting from horizontal mergers affect
that index depending on the good considered.7
To answer the above questions, we will present a model that allows firms to choose
the type of merger. Then, consider an industry of composite goods formed by two
components, A and B. There are n independent firms producing varieties of com-
ponent A and n firms producing varieties of its complementary component B. Com-
ponents’ compatibility results in n × n composite goods in the market. We assume
consumers choose components to create their own composite goods and get utility,
since consuming separate components is useless. Therefore, composite goods com-
pete as imperfect substitutes, but at the same time different type components are
complements while same type components are also substitutes. The proponent firm
chooses between merging with a substitute component producer, with a complemen-
tary component producer or remaining alone. Focusing on strategic effects, we find
that a vertical merger is privately preferred only when composite goods are very dif-
ferentiated or when the number of firms is greater than 11, the horizontal merger is
chosen otherwise.8 Therefore horizontal mergers are more suitable tools rather than
vertical ones to increase business profits when products are less differentiated and the
6 Nevertheless, horizontal mergers are frequently proposed and accepted by antitrust authorities. For exam-
ple, a merger between two of the six major publishing companies, Random House and Penguin Group
(Pearson) has been recently announced. It will reach a turnover of e3,000 million. The new firm, Penguin
Random House, has been approved by antitrust authorities from US, New Zealand, Australia, EU, Canada,
South Africa and China, all of them without conditions.
7 The index used is related to the Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions (CMCR) concept that was
initially proposed by Werden (1996) and by Froeb and Werden (1998). It is also related to the Upward
Pricing Pressure Index (UPPI) in its more accurate version. The UPPI have been recently incorporated
by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) to evaluate potential unilateral effects in mergers and included in the US
Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in 2010 by the USDOJ and FTC (U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission 2010).
8 Both mergers are qualitatively different, not only by the component combinations, but also because the
vertical merger allows more pricing strategies (pure bundling and mixed bundling).
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number of composite goods available in the market is not very large, i.e. greater than
121. The Cournot effect derived from a vertical merger, that is the price reduction for
two complements when they are sold by the same firm rather than by separate monop-
olists, is dominated by the competition effect resulting from a horizontal merger, that
is the acquisition of greater market power derived from the internalization of compe-
tition within substitutes through the partial monopolization of one component. Two
interesting policy implications are reached: (i) when only strategic effects are reck-
oned, proposed vertical mergers have to be always cleared while proposed horizontal
mergers must be always blocked by antitrust authorities. And (ii) merger proposals
different from the equilibrium ones are sufficient conditions for antitrust agencies to
infer substantial efficiencies not considered that justify those proposals. Focusing on
the case of n = 2, the above results and policy implications are most of the times
qualitatively robust to the consideration of alternative assumptions such as differ-
ent number of producers for each component, three components instead of two, not
compatible components and differences in quality among firms producing the same
component. Several asymmetries arise between firms in industries with such alterna-
tive assumptions, what makes the equilibriummerger be sensitive to the identity of the
proposer. However, the socially optimal merger maintains basically the same pattern
with some variations in the ranges for the differentiation ratio required to clear vertical
mergers.
If firms do the same activity, it seems natural to consider costs savings after amerger
due to the similarity in production of both components.9 Efficiencies are obtained from
the rationalization of production, economies of scale, technological progress (know-
how, R&D), purchasing economies or savings in factor prices.10 If efficiency gains are
sufficiently large to extend the benefits to consumers, then antitrust authorities have
reasons to clear proposed horizontal mergers. Then a direct question raises, which is
this minimum required efficiency to clear a horizontal merger in a composite good
industry? In order to answer this question the level of marginal cost saving that results
in a non-increase in the price index used is computed. We find that a greater marginal
cost saving is required for a horizontal merger in a composite good industry not to
increase prices as compared with a horizontal merger in a regular good industry. The
above result is interesting for antitrust authorities since it advises them to be more
demanding when dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods industries. We
would like to note that this difference is rooted to the higher diversion ratio and margin
that arise in composite good industries.
The received literature
Salant et al. (1983) initiates the analysis of the strategic motives for exogenous merg-
ers. The main finding being that mergers of Cournot oligopolists producing substitute
goods are unprofitable unless they include enough participants, while outsiders are
9 In the empirical paper by Gayle and Le (2013) two real mergers between airline companies are studied.
They found evidence of fixed and marginal cost savings in both cases. In another industry, Harrison (2011)
found that hospital mergers involved cost savings, which are greater the first post-merger year than the
following ones.
10 For an exhaustive analysis about efficiency gains from mergers see Röller et al. (2001).
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always better off.11 Gaudet and Salant (1992) extend SSR’s analysis to complementary
goods and price competition, getting the same conclusions about merger profitability
but opposite welfare outcome. Beggs (1994) studies merging decisions in a setting of
two groups with two firms each, where products are complements within the group but
substitutes across groups and no compatibility is assumed. Firms producing comple-
ments usually prefer acting independently instead of merging. Economides and Salop
(1992) analyze the price effects derived from different exogenous market structures in
an industry with two brands for each compatible component and no bundling strate-
gies. Choi (2008) takes Economides and Salop’s framework to study strategic motives
to engage only in complementary mergers allowing for mixed bundling.12 Our con-
tribution to the merger literature hinges on the case in which consumers assemble the
components of composite goods and only joint consumption yields utility. We wish to
move a step forward by addressing the incentives to merge when two types of merger
are possible in the same industry: among same type component producers or among
different type ones.
The binomial mergers-efficiency effects is considered since Perry and Porter (1985)
who state that incentives to merge depend on two effects: price increases and output
decreases. Allowing for a larger merged firm (with lower marginal cost) than previous
independent firms, the output reduction is softer than in SSR. Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) present internal efficiencies where firms have different costs, showing that
economies of scale or learning effects needed for amerger to decrease prices are greater
the larger are the market shares of the merging firms and the less elastic is industry
demand.13 More recent papers focus on dynamic models of endogenous mergers,
as Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) and Vasconcelos (2010), where a comparison is
established between myopic and forward looking antitrust authorities. The former
paper shows that if efficiencies are strong, prices might be lower after the merger,
even if some firms exit. The efficiency offense argument cannot be sustained with
forward looking antitrust authorities, since rival firms will engage in a merger as well.
The latter paper focuses on structural remedies inmerger control, which are not needed
to implement the preferred market structure with forward looking authorities but they
are necessary for optimal decisions with myopic ones. Banal Estañol et al. (2008)
focus on questioning the realization of efficiencies. If antitrust authorities take them
for granted, mistakes are found in both sides: approving welfare-reducing mergers and
blocking welfare-enhancing ones. Closer to our model is Motta (2004), who finds a
sufficient level of efficiencygains for a horizontalmerger to be beneficial for consumers
11 In Deneckere and Davidson (1985) every merger is profitable, due to upward-sloping reaction functions.
Kamien and Zang (1990) develop a two-stage game of endogenous mergers in a market with homogenous
products, finding that full monopolization of an industry is not the usual result.
12 In the case consumers also obtain utility by consuming the components separately, Flores Fillol and
Moner Colonques (2011) find that merging is a dominant strategy with soft competition and incentives to
merge are higher if component demands are not too important.
13 An extension to this model and Werden and Froeb (1998) but allowing for entry is Spector (2003) who
finds that profitable mergers with no technological synergies are harmful for consumers regardless of fixed
costs or entry conditions. Efficiencies and free-entry are also studied in Cabral (2003), who states that a
merger defense based on cost efficiencies changes if post-merger entry is allowed, because there is a more
efficient firm. However, entry will be less likely since new rivals will face tougher price competition.
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when firms choose prices in a static framework.We extend it by analyzing a composite
good industry with differentiated goods finding the required synergy which implies a
non-increase in prices and how it compares with a regular good industry.
Next section describes the model and presents the type of merger which is prefer-
able from a private and a social point of view. It also include a subsection with the
rivals reaction to a former merger and a robustness subsection. In Sect. 3 the model is
extended to include efficiencies inmarginal cost, a price variation index corresponding
to the Horizontal merger in a composite good industry is provided and compared with
the one that would arise if the industry would not be a composite good one. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
Consider a situation where consumers need to combine two complementary compo-
nents, A and B, in fixed proportions on a one-to-one basis, to form a composite good
because they only get utility by consuming composite goods. The industry consists of
n × n initially independent firms, n of them producing type A components, denoted
by i with i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the other n producing type B components, denoted by
j with j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Full compatibility is assumed, that is any component of one
type is fully compatible with any other component of the different type, therefore up
to n × n different composite goods can be consumed, i.e. A1B1, A1B2, …A1Bn−1,
A1Bn, …An B1, An B2, …An Bn .
Note that the underlying market is one where both substitute and complement
components are strategically linked, but consumers only choose among substitute
composite goods. The quantity consumed of composite good Ai B j is denoted by Xi j
where subscript i j = 11, 12, . . . , 1n, . . . , n1, . . . nn refers to all composite goods
mentioned above. The price of component Ai is denoted by pi while the price of
component B j is denoted by q j . Therefore, composite good or system i j is available
at price si j = pi + q j . The system of demand functions is obtained considering
a representative consumer product differentiation model, with the following utility
function:14





































where α, β, γ > 0 are the demand parameters in the model and y is the quantity
of numeraire good consumed. Utility maximization under the following budget con-
straint, I = y + ∑∀i j si j Xi j leads to the next system of inverse demand functions,
si j = α − (β − γ )Xi j − γ ∑∀kl Xkl , ∀i j where i, j, k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Finally, by
inverting the above system, the next system of demand functions is reached,
14 In fact, this is reformulation of the commonly used utility function that is easier to manipulate for an
arbitrary number of products.
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Xi j = α(β − γ ) −
(
β + (n2 − 1) γ ) si j + γ ∑∀kl skl
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ ) ∀i j, (1)
As indicated above composite goods are imperfect substitutes, own effects in demand
are negative and greater, in absolute value, than cross effects if condition β > γ
holds. This condition is standard and simply says that an increase of the same amount
in all prices will imply a decrease in demand. Finally, as parameter γ approaches
β, composite goods become more similar (less differentiated) to consumers and in
the extreme case where γ equals zero all goods become independent.15 Regarding
component production costs, and to simplify the model as much as possible, it is
assumed that marginal costs are constant, common and equal to c. Firms profits are
πAi = (pi − c)
∑
∀ j Xi j and πB j = (q j − c)
∑
∀i Xi j for component type A and B
producers, respectively.
In this initial situation, each firm in the industry is identified with a single com-
ponent which is used by consumers to assemble the n different composite goods
containing such a component. We are interested in finding the initial Nash equilibrium
in prices. Each firm chooses the component price to maximize profits. Equilibrium
prices of every component, the total amount of output sold by a given producer and
producer’s profits read as follows, where superscript I is denoting the initial situation
and emphasize that variables are function of n:16
pIi = q Ij = pI (n) =
(β − γ )(α − 2c)
3β + (n2 − n − 3) γ + c (2)
∑
∀ j
X Ii j (n) =
∑
∀i
X Ii j (n) =
n
(
β + (n2 − n − 1) γ ) (α − 2c)(
β + (n2 − 1) γ ) (3β + (n2 − n − 3) γ ) (3)
π IAi = π IB j = π I (n) =
n(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − n − 1) γ ) (α − 2c)2
(
β + (n2 − 1) γ ) (3β + (n2 − n − 3) γ )2
(4)
Consider now that one firm decides to merge with another. Without loss of gener-
ality, along the merger proposal A1 is arbitrarily chosen to be the proposer, that is, the
firm deciding whom to merge with. The other part, the respondent, can either accept
or reject it. If a proposed merger is profitable as a whole, any respondent will undoubt-
edly accept it, since the proposer will offer the same profits earned the previous period
plus an epsilon to the respondent. Only mergers that will be accepted at equilibrium
will be proposed. Two different kinds of merger can be proposed depending on the
15 Notice that it is assumed that all rival composite goods are symmetric imperfect substitutes, although it
would be more natural to assume composite goods sharing one component to be closer substitutes than the
composite good with no shared component. However, this complication in the analysis is not fully justified
since no important differences in results are obtained.
16 Each firm is setting one part of the composite good price for n different composite goods. Then, by
reducing its price, it is getting a positive effect equal to the sum of the production sold in every of its
composite goods and a negative effect with is proportional to the margin and also to a term which increases
with γ and n. As a consequence larger γ or n induce both lower equilibrium prices and quantities, with
margins decreasing at a larger rate.
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identity of the respondent, either a horizontal merger, denoted by H , if another firm
of the same type to the proposers is chosen or, a vertical merger, denoted by V if the
respondent is a type-B producer.
The horizontal merger analysis
Consider a merger between the two producers of the same type of components, e.g.
the A1A2 merger. Firms not participating in the merger are named as the outsiders.
There are outsiders of each type when n > 2. The new firm partially internalizes
competition among composite goods by partially monopolizing one component in the
market. Equilibrium prices and profits can be found in the Appendix. Superscript H
identifies the horizontal merger case and subscripts M and O refer to the prices set
by the merger and by the outsiders, respectively. The following ranking identifies the
effect of a H merger in the market: pHM (n) > p
H
O (n) > p
I (n) > q HO (n).
Partial monopolization by a H merger will lead to increases in the prices of the
components that are directly affected by themerger, e.g. pi , and reductions in the prices
corresponding to the other type of component. The reason is that the marginal benefit
is now larger at any price for the new entity, thus leading to a higher equilibrium
price which results by strategic substitutability among p’s and q’s to lower q’s and
by strategic complementarity among p’s to higher p’s. Besides, the differences in
component prices shown in the above ranking are decreasing in the number of firms
in the market. However, consumers react to composite good prices. Notice that, if
n > 2, consumers can obtain composite goods either including one component of the
merged firm or just using components produced by outsiders. The former are sold at
a higher price as compared to the initial situation and also at a higher price than those
formed with outsider’s components. However, the latter can be sold at a lower price




n2+1 . Meaning that when products are differentiated enough a H merger
may lead to reductions in composite good prices.
Several comments are in order. First, the merged firm is better off offering the full
range of components rather than restricting them. The reason is that more composite
goods in themarket allow themerged entity to capture greater share of industry profits,
at the expense of outsiders. Second, there is always an incentive to form a H merger.
Third, outsiders of the same type are better off after a H merger, while outsiders
of different type are worse off, as a consequence the H merger implies a shift in
profits from type B component producers to type A ones. Finally industry profits after
the merger might decrease if composite goods are very differentiated since losses in
different-type outsiders offset gains by the merged entity and same-type outsiders. As
products become more homogeneous all profits decrease, but the merged entity is able
to deal better with the increase in competition since it has more market power than
firms only controlling one component.
The vertical merger analysis
Consider now a merger between two producers of different components: e.g. the
A1B1 merger. The new entity is able to implement a mixed bundling pricing strategy,
that is, it selects three prices p1, q1 and the bundle price sb, where at equilibrium,
sb < p1+q1 = s11. The demand systemmust then be reformulated substituting s11 for
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sb, as nowcomposite good A1B1 is only demanded as a bundle, since it offers a discount
on price.17 This implies that the merger now gets revenues from directly selling one
composite good (i.e. the bundle X11) and from the selling of two components which
are combined by consumers to form 2(n − 1) mix-and-match composite goods (i.e.
X1 j for j = 1 and Xi1 for i = 1). The remaining (n − 1) × (n − 1) composite
goods are totally controlled by outsiders. The new entity and outsiders maximize
profits by choosing prices. The equilibrium prices are listed in the Appendix and
can be ranked as follows: pVM (n) > p
I (n) > pVO(n), for the component prices and
sVM O(n) > s
I (n) > sVO (n) > s
V
b (n), for the composite good prices. Superscript
V denotes Vertical, while subscripts O, M O and b are denoting outsiders, mix-
and-match composite goods and the bundle, respectively. Notice, that both types of
outsiders price their components at the same level, pVO(n), since they face identical
strategic conditions. The effect of a verticalmerger is then an increase in the component
prices produced by themerger and a reduction in components produced by outsiders as
compared to the initial situation. Focusing on composite good prices, mix-and-match
composite goods are sold at a higher price than composite goods before the merger
(i.e. sVM O(n) > s
I (n)), while composite goods assembled using outsider components
are priced lower, s I (n) > sVO (n). Finally, the bundle reaches the lowest price. As it
might occur in a H merger, we find that some composite goods increase their price
while others do not after amerger. Thus, the general presumption thatmergers between
complements lead to lower prices is not completely true. This happens because the
merger increases its single component prices to benefit its bundle demand, in detriment
of mix-and-match composite goods demands. The effects on prices of a merger are
smoothed as the number of firms increase. Notice that,in contrast with the Horizontal
merger case, the consideration of more than two firms per component is not implying
a qualitative change.
However, it turns out that mixed bundling can be improved upon by the merged
entity only focusing on the selling of the bundle and stop selling A1 and B1 components
separately (i.e. pure bundling). The following result identifies under which conditions
mixed bundling will be chosen:
Result 1 The merged entity is better off implementing mixed bundling either if n ≥ 4,
or for 2 ≤ n < 4 when composite goods are rather differentiated, i.e. for γ
β
< 0.665
if n = 2, and γ
β
< 0.883 if n = 3. Pure bundling arises at equilibrium otherwise.
The reason is that close substitutability among composite goods imposes at equi-
librium too high component prices in order to keep the bundle appealing, thus ending
up in a situation where it is better not to serve the mix-and-match markets. Since more
firms in the market smooths price differentials, this effect disappears for n > 3.
In fact, when pure bundling is used at equilibrium, the strategic effect is completely
twisted since sVpb(n) > s
V
pO(n) > s
I (n), where the p in the subscript is referring to the
pure bundling case. The unilateral effect of a vertical merger is to increase prices upon
the initial situation, which is followed by another increase in outsider prices ending
up in a situation that harms consumers.
17 As noted by Tirole (2005): “buying the bundle is really the only feasible option if the prices of the
individual products are high”.
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Interestingly, the incentive to merge is always positive and increasing with n only if
products are very differentiated, otherwise this incentive is decreasing. The outsiders’
reaction is larger when products are close substitutes reducing the potential gains for
the new entity. So that the incentive to merge for a given n is decreasing in the γ
β
ratio.
The new entity’s strategic superiority (three strategic variables) is used to drain profits
from both the composite goods produced by outsiders and the mix-and-match ones to
the bundle. In fact the new entity gets more profits with the selling of the bundle than
the pre-merger profits corresponding to the same composite good. This profits increase
suffices to cover the reduction in profits coming from the mix-and-match composite
goods. The Vertical merger imposes a negative externality (when mixed bundling is in
place) on outsiders profits since they are compelled to reduce margins without getting
a higher market share. The combination of both effects leads to a decrease in industry
profits after the merger for intermediate values of product differentiation, since in such
a case the increase in profits realized by the new entity ismore than compensated by the
reduction of outsiders’ profits when the merger undertakes mixed bundling. Finally,
when the merger undertakes pure bundling and composite goods are sufficiently close
all firms increase their profits after a merger leading to an increase in industry profits.
The equilibrium merger
After describing the effects of each type of merger, we are interested in finding which
one yields higher profits, that is, the sign of R(n, γ
β
) ≡ π HM (n) − πVM (n), or more
precisely in the γ
β
that solves R(n, γ
β
) = 0 for each n. Although there is not a closed-
form solution, it is found that the limit of R is negative when γ tends to zero, which
implies that when composite goods are not very much related a V merger is always
implemented. Besides, when γ
β
tends to one, that is if composite goods are close to
perfect substitutes, then a H merger is implemented only when n < 11,18 otherwise
only V mergers will be observed at equilibrium. We also know that when the number
of firms in between 2 and 11 then, V mergers will only arise at equilibrium for small
enough values of the γ
β
ratio, noticing that the threshold in γ
β
changes in a non-
monotoneway as n increases. In Table 1 belowwe have included the precise thresholds
in γ
β
for several n. In the next Proposition the conditions for each type of merger to
endogenously arise are summarized.19
Proposition 1 The equilibrium merger that will arise in a composite goods market
depends on both how differentiated the composite goods are and the number of firms
producing each component as follows:
The V merger will be the equilibrium one either when products are very differ-
entiated and n < 11 or always if n ≥ 11; the H merger is the equilibrium one
otherwise.
In Choi (2008) only vertical mergers are considered, however, when firms also have
the option to create a horizontalmerger and the number of firms producing components
18 Notice that this restriction implies up to 20 firms in the market and no less than 100 composite goods
competing, then it fits with a large number of oligopoly industries.
19 Proofs are available upon request from the authors. Note that differences in profits only depend on the
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Table 1 Equilibrium mergers
Number of firms Differentiation ratio Private decision
n = 2 If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.0958 V proposed
If 0.0958 < γ
β
< 1 H proposed
n = 3 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.0819 V proposed
If 0.0819 < γβ < 1 H proposed
n = 5 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.0741 V proposed
If 0.0741 < γ
β
< 1 H proposed
n = 7 If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.0833 V proposed
If 0.0833 < γ
β
< 1 H proposed
n = 9 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.1297 V proposed
If 0.1297 < γβ < 1 H proposed
n ≥ 11 Always V proposed
is not too large, vertical mergers only arise for low values of the γ
β
ratio, while a H
merger is privately preferred otherwise. If γ
β
is close to zero composite goods are
very differentiated and competition is not intense, thus the merged firm prefers to
fully control one composite good through a vertical merger. In this way the new entity
benefits from the so-called Cournot effect, the price reduction for two complements
when they are sold by the same firm rather than by separate monopolists. The merger
leads to a reduction in both complement prices, since the newfirm captures the demand
increase in the composite good when it lowers the other component’s price. As γ
β
increases, composite goods are less differentiated and competition is more intense.
Prices are already rather low, so amerger between complementsmakes prices decrease
even more, and this makes the vertical merger less profitable. Then, it is preferable
to internalize the effects of competition within substitutes, the competition effect, by
partially monopolizing one component type. In this way, the merger controls one
component in 2n composite goods, increasing its market power. The above argument
works out even for the case where the V merger implies pure bundling. Then, H
mergers aremore suitable tools rather than V ones to increase business profitswhen the
number of firms is lower than 22. The Cournot effect is dominated by the competition
effect.20 Considering composite goods changes the intuition we have about the effects
in the market of increasing the number of competitors. One more component producer
is not only increasing competition in the market but also allowing existing firms to
sell more composite goods that were not previously available. As a consequence, if
composite goods are very much differentiated, the increase in demand may offset the
increase in competition so firms get more profits with more firms in the market. The
Cournot effect is capitalizing this effect as it is larger than the competition effect when
composite goods are very differentiated.When, given n, competition becomes tougher
20 In case of considering both strategic effects and efficiencies, the aggregate effect of each type of merger
will determine which merger arises at equilibrium. Then, if the efficiencies are larger after a vertical merger,
such type of mergers will be proposed in a larger range of the differentiation ratio.
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because composite goods are more substitutable, the competition effect is less affected
by the increase in competition. However, as the number of firms increase, the gain
derived from a H merger is decreasing more quickly than the gain derived from a V
one.
The socially optimal merger
Finally, to answer our initial research question, it is important to analyze whether the
proposed mergers arising from the previous subsection would be cleared by antitrust
authorities. Antitrust authorities make decisions based on how the proposed merger
affects either Consumer Surplus (CS) or Social Welfare (SW) standards. To obtain
the Social Welfare measure we take the utility function and subtract the costs paid
by firms. Then, to obtain Consumer Surplus, we have to subtract the profits of all
firms in the market to the Social Welfare. The precise expressions can be found in the
Appendix. Which merger is socially preferred is in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 The highest level of Social Welfare, which is a function of the degree
differentiation, is attained as follows: (i) through a V merger if composite goods are
enough differentiated; (ii) or not clearing any type of merger otherwise.
The highest level of Consumer Surplus is attained under qualitatively similar sit-
uations as for the Social Welfare case, with the difference that a V merger is cleared
for a larger interval of the differentiation ratio.
Finally, the condition for a vertical merger to be cleared becomes more restrictive
as the number of component producers increases, irrespective of the standard used.
Table 2 includes the precise conditions for a V merger to be cleared under both
standards and how they vary according to the number of component producers. As
already established in the previous subsection, after an H merger component prices
react in a way that induce increases in the composite good prices with one of the
components controlled by the new entity, and also reductions in those composite goods
made up with outsider’s components. However, the overall effect is that consumer
Table 2 Clearance conditions under the CS and SW standards
Number of firms CS Standard SW Standard
n = 2 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.6259 V cleared If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.4090 V cleared
If 0.6259 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked If 0.4090 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked
n = 3 If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.3967 V cleared If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.1943 V cleared
If 0.3967 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked If 0.1943 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked
n = 5 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.1798 V cleared If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.0694 V cleared
If 0.1798 < γβ < 1 Both blocked If 0.0694 <
γ
β < 1 Both blocked
n = 11 If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.0411 V cleared If 0 < γβ ≤ 0.0137 V cleared
If 0.0411 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked If 0.0137 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked
n = 25 If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.0081 V cleared If 0 < γ
β
≤ 0.0026 V cleared
If 0.0081 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked If 0.0026 < γ
β
< 1 Both blocked
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surplus decreases in comparison to the initial situation. This occurs for every n and
every value in the differentiation ratio. This latter effect on consumers is reinforced
since industry profits might fall when products are sufficiently differentiated. Finally,
in case industry profits increase, this positive effect on social welfare is offset by the
negative effect on consumers. Thus the conclusion is clear: when only strategic effects
are considered, the H merger is never socially preferred. On the contrary, after a V
merger consumers can be better off depending on how similar composite goods are
perceived. Only V mergers that undertake mixed bundling at equilibrium may attain
the highest consumer and total surplus. The new firm sets a bundle price lower than
the composite good price prior to the merger. In addition, the strategic reaction by
outsiders leads to outsider composite good prices decrease with respect to the initial
situation. Finally, mix-and-match composite goods have increased their price. Thus,
it turns out that CS is higher after the V merger if products are differentiated enough,
despite consumption is diverted from the mix-and-match to the bundle and outsider
composite goods. Additionally, industry profits might decrease which explains why
the clearing threshold is more restrictive under the SW standard. The results about the
V merger are partially in line with those in Choi (2008), since at some threshold in
the differentiation ratio, it is socially better not to engage in any merger. We find that
this threshold is more demanding as the number of component producers increase, the
reason is that both SW and CS decline more when a V merger is in place as compared
to the decline produced in the initial situation.
Policy implications
In view of Propositions 1 and 2, there is a clear-cut policy implication regardless of the
standard considered: when only strategic effects are reckoned, proposed V mergers
have to be always cleared while proposed H mergers must be always forbidden by
antitrust authorities.
Therefore, a market failure arises when a proposed H merger would never be
approved. In fact, two types of market failure can be considered, one that implies a
proposed merger type different to the socially optimal one (i.e. for 0.0958 < γ
β
<
0.4090 under the SW standard and n = 2), and a second one that implies that no
merger is the social maximizing outcome. Finally, when composite goods are very
differentiated, no market failure arises as any proposed V merger will be cleared.
To complete the analysis let us think of a situation, which is usually the case, where
antitrust authorities have less information than firms involved in a merger. Then, if
firms submit a V merger proposal that is not expected at equilibrium, that is for
γ
β
> 0.0958 and n = 2, antitrust authorities should infer that this V merger will come
out with cost efficiencies and, therefore, should be approved. This is an indication that
the strategic incentives to merge have being countervailed by efficiency gains (such
as production cost savings through economies of scale and scope, improvements in
quality or service, reductions in transactional costs or increased incentives for R&D
processes, and so on) anticipated by the firms which are making the V merger more
profitable than a H one in that case. Since efficiency gains are good for consumers,
antitrust authorities will bemorewilling to accept the proposedmerger. In other words,
when firms propose a type of merger different from the equilibrium one, authorities
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face cases where the efficiency effects obtained are substantial to make that merger
type preferable.
The effects of a countermerger
One interesting question raised by a referee is whichwould be the reaction in the indus-
try after a former merger. In addressing this question we consider that after each type
of merger, outsiders might propose a same type merger or a different one. Therefore,
three different market structures are analyzed. The first one is the sequential horizontal
merger, denoted by H H , the second is the sequential vertical merger, denoted by V V ,
and finally a mixed situation with one horizontal and one vertical merger, denoted
by H V . Regarding the H H , consider that the firm producing component A3 decides
to propose a horizontal merger. It has two options, either to merge with the already
formed merger with firms producing components A1 and A2 or to form an alternative
merger with other single component producer, say A4. We show that the proposer
would prefer to merge with the initial merger rather than forming an alternative one.21
This occurs for any n and the firms involved will be better off by forming the merger.
The effect of such an extended merger in the market as compared to the situation with
one horizontal merger is that outsiders of the same type are better off, while outsiders
producing a component of a different type are worse off. Outsiders aggregate profits
decrease. However, the effect on total profits including the merger is that the extended
merger increase them only if the ratio γ
β
is large enough, noting that the condition is
relaxed as the number of firms increase.
Next, consider a sequential vertical merger, in this case we study the market with
the initial merger between firms producing components A1 and B1 and a new one
between firms producing components An and Bn . The effect in the industry is that the
second vertical merger reduces the profits of the initial vertical merger, and also those
of outsiders. Finally, industry profits increase only for large enough values of γ
β
. As
it occurs in the H H situation, the condition that implies an increase in total profits
is less demanding as the number of firms increase. We finally consider the market
situation with one horizontal merger between firms producing components A1 and A2
and a vertical merger between firms producing components An and Bn . The effect
induced on the market depend on the initial situation. Consider that the initial merger
was a H one, then a subsequent vertical merger will imply lower profits for the initial
merge, and all the outsiders of any type. Industry profits follow the same pattern as
a V V merger. However, if the initial merger is a V one, the effect of a subsequent
horizontal merger is to increase profits for all outsiders, and to increase profits of the
initial merger and industry profits if the ratio γ
β
is large enough.
In order to illustrate the endogenous merger formation with two steps we present
the cases for n = 5, n = 11 and for n = 13 in the next result.
Result 2 Consider n = 5, the sequence of endogenous mergers that arise is
(a) VV for 0 < γ
β
< 0.0694
(b) VH for 0.0694 < γ
β
< 0.0741
(c) HH for 0.0741 < γ
β
< 1
21 Equilibrium expressions and proofs of this subsection are available from the authors upon request.
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Consider n = 11, the sequence of endogenous mergers that arise is
(a) VV for 0 < γ
β
< 0.9350
(b) VH for 0.9350 < γ
β
< 1
Consider n = 13, the sequence of endogenous mergers that arise is VV ∀ γ
β
∈ (0, 1).
The above result indicates that a V V merger arise in more situations when the
number of firms increase, being the only one expected for a sufficiently large n. The
pattern found in Proposition 1 is repeated when the number of firms is bellow 11, that
is, when composite goods are very differentiated a second vertical merger is formed,
while the horizontal one is added when composite goods are closer, the threshold for
finding a second horizontalmerger increaseswith then number of firms. Regarding SW
and CS, the effect of a HH merger is always to reduce them with respect to either the
initial situation orwith respect to the H merger. The effect of aVVmerger is to improve
welfare and consumer surplus in case of rather differentiated composite goods. The
effect of a V H merger is to improve welfare and consumer surplus with respect to
either the initial situation or with respect to a H merger if composite products are very
differentiated. However, when compared to a V merger, social welfare and consumer
surplus always decrease. As a final comment, the proposal of a new horizontal merger
in themarket will be always blockedwhile the proposal of a vertical one will be always
cleared.
Robustness
We are now interested on how the results presented above change when we depart
from the case presented above if n = 2. In particular, which is the equilibrium merger
and the effects on welfare when either, a) the number of producers differs across
components, or b) there are three components in a composite good, or c) components
are not fully compatible, or finally d) when there are producers that offer components
of different quality.
(a) Differences in the number of producers across components
Consider an asymmetric industry where, without loss of generality, there are three
type A component producers and only two type B component producers. In this mar-
ket structure, there are two different kinds of horizontal mergers depending on the
proposer: one that entails no outsiders of the same type (when the proposer is a type
B producer) and another one with one outsider. A first result is that both horizontal
mergers plus the vertical one are always profitable with respect to the initial situation.
Also, the equilibrium merger depends on who is the proposer as follows: (i) Type
B producer proposers will always choose the H merger, the incentives to become a
monopolist in one type of component outperform the profits of the vertical merger
available. (ii) Type A producer proposers will always prefer a V merger. Therefore,
the interplay between the Cournot and the competition effects is very sensitive to the
asymmetry in the number of producers of each component. In fact, a H merger in the
more concentrated component industry fully monopolize that industry and partially
controls all the composite goods in the market, while a H merger in the less con-
centrated component partially controls a share of the composite goods in the market.
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That difference is enough to make more advantageous a V merger if there is no partial
control of all the composite good prices.
Regarding the effect on welfare, the highest level of SW is obtained with the V
merger for 0 < γ
β
< 0.29 or not clearing any merger otherwise. The highest level
of CS is also achieved with the V merger for 0 < γ
β
< 0.51 or by not clearing any
merger otherwise. Thus, the pattern of the socially preferred outcome is similar to
the one in the symmetric model, although the ranges for the differentiation ratio in
which the vertical merger is cleared are slightly reduced. Interestingly enough, a type
A producer proposer will prefer a V merger in the whole range of the differentiation
ratio, allowing for merger clearings in a larger range either considering CS or SW
standards, while a type B producer proposer will prefer a H merger which will be
never cleared.
(b) Three components
Consider now that the composite good is formed by three components: A, B and C.
In an industry with two producers for each component we will have six independent
firms. Three different mergers are analyzed: a H merger, a V merger with the three
components of the composite good and another V mergerwith only two components of
the composite good. All of them are always preferred compared to the initial situation
of all independent firms. However, we will initially focus on the second type of V
merger to be more consistent with the initial setting where only mergers of two firms
are considered. Notice that as before, a H merger implies fully monopolization of
one component but the adding of one more component to the composite good implies
lower margins for the merged firm and also for the outsiders; while a V merger is a less
powerful tool to control the composite good market, since now there is no full control
of a composite good. As a consequence V mergers become a less attractive option so
that only the H merger arises at equilibrium. Regarding SW and CS, similar patterns
as in the model with two components arise, but now both ranges in which the vertical
merger is optimal for the society are slightly more demanding, more differentiation
in the composite good is needed in order to clear a V merger. In case the V merger
involved the control of thewhole bundle then the V merger option arises at equilibrium
for a larger range in the differentiation ratio as compared to the standard model. This
is an expected result since a merger of three firms is more profitable than one of two.
(c) Components are not fully compatible
As noted above n2 composite goods can be assembled when components are fully
compatible. No compatibility imposes restrictions among the combinations consumers
can make. Firms usually establish such restrictions based on technical or physical
elements. If this is the case, we will assume that, for example, only components
with the same subscript can be assembled leading to a market with only n composite
goods. When n = 2, the no compatibility case reduces the number of composite
goods by two. Each firm reacts by increasing its component price since it is not now
internalizing competition among the composite goods that use its component leading
to less demand per component, although the composite goods remaining in the market
are soldmore. Since the increase in the output per composite good does not compensate
for the reduction in the number of them, consumers are worse off if the market turns
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to be of not compatible components. Social welfare is also reduced, but for firms
no compatibility pays off when composite goods are not very differentiated, i.e. for
γ
β
> 0.623. Regarding the equilibrium merger, it is firstly checked that a H merger is
always leading to larger profits for participants, however, a V merger does not in any
case. That is, V mergers are not yielding enough profits when the differentiation ratio
is large, in particular for γ
β
> 0.604, the increase in demand the merged entity receives
induced by the reduction in the bundle price is not compensating initial profits. There
are not nowmix-and-match composite goods that push profits upwards. Finally, the V
merger will arise at equilibrium when composite goods are sufficiently differentiated,
that is for γ
β
< 0.261, the H merger otherwise. Thus, no compatibility reduces the
number of composite goods in the market which implies a reduction in profits for
the H merger, while the V merger decrease in profits is lower or even it is turned an
increase in profits if γ
β
> 0.665. Then, it can be concluded that the Cournot effect is
more intense than the competition effect in a market with few composite goods per
firm.22 Outsiders are in any case worse off after either merger. Finally and regarding
welfare, the conclusions follow the same patterns as in the compatibility case, only V
mergers might be cleared. The effect of no compatibility is to increase the range of
the clearance for the V merger under both welfare standards. That is, a V merger is
always cleared under the CS standard and it is cleared if γ
β
< 0.984 under the SW
standard. Then our policy implications apply to the no compatibility case, all proposed
H merger has to be blocked, while all proposed V should be cleared.
(d) Quality differences among components of the same type
Consider the following extension of the model by assuming two qualities, for instance
component A+1 will have a higher quality modeled as a higher willingness to pay
in the utility function. The coefficient of the linear term in the utility function for all
composite goods including A+1 is nowα+τ (where τ is positive)while for those that do
not include it is α. The effect of one component of higher quality is to enhance demand
for all composite goods including the higher quality component and shift inwards the
demand of those not including it. Equilibrium component prices of composite goods
including A+1 increase with respect to the symmetric situation since those composite
goods benefit from the increase in quality of one of its components, while the price
of component of A2 is reduced. Similarly, profits for all firms increase except for the
firm producing component A2.
The question is how the asymmetry in quality affects the firms decision on which
type of merger to undertake. It becomes now relevant to distinguish between the
mergers proposed by the high quality producer, that is a H merger between A+1 and
A2, or a V merger between A
+
1 and B1, from those proposed by a low quality one, for
instance a H merger between B1 and B2, or a V merger between A2 and B2. First note
that, typically, the effect of a H merger of any quality type is to increase the prices of the
components involved in themerger and to reduce those of the components not involved.
Regarding profits, the effect of a H merger of any type is to reduce outsiders profits,
22 It is worth noting that for n = 2 a V merger that undertakes pure bundling in a compatibility situation
leads to the same equilibrium prices that one operating in a no compatibility market. For n > 2 it is not
longer true.
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and it is also proven that both types of H mergers are profitable. Regarding welfare
a H merger among the low quality components is leading to the same conclusions
as the symmetric model, it always reduces both CS and SW. However, a H merger
proposed by the high quality producer might increase CS when products are very
differentiated and the difference in quality is large enough.23 There is a shift from
low quality composite goods to high quality ones that might favor consumers despite
the increase in prices. SW is always lower. Regarding the effect of a V merger on
composite good prices, it is now more complex to analyze since after the merger
there are five different component prices. After a V merger including the high quality
component, the bundle (i.e. A1B1) is sold at a lower price, but all the other composite
goods may either increase or decrease their price. For instance, outsiders’ composite
good is sold at a lower price if composite goods are not very differentiated, but it can be
sold at a higher price if products are very differentiated and there are large differences
in quality. Similarly, mix-and-match composite good prices can be reduced instead
of increase their price when products are very differentiated and large differences in
quality. After a V merger of low quality components, the bundle (i.e. A2B2) is sold
at a lower price, the mix-and-match composite goods are sold at higher prices, while
the outsiders composite good is typically sold at lower price except for situations with
large quality differences and not very differentiated composite goods.
Finally and undertaking a local analysis in the neighborhoodof τ = 0, the difference
in profits between proposing a H merger and proposing a V one when the proposer
is the high quality producer is decreasing in quality showing that small differences in
quality are making more likely the proposal of V mergers. Then a V merger is a better
instrument for the high quality firm to take advantage of its better quality. The result
totally changes when it is the low quality firm the proposer since the difference in
profits of proposing a H merger increase with respect to those of proposing a V one,
that is a H merger is a better instrument for low quality firms to partially compensate
from their disadvantage in quality. Regarding CS and SW, small differences in quality
increase the differences in both welfare standards in favor of the V merger regardless
of who propose it.
3 Horizontal mergers with efficiencies
Now the model is extended to include efficiency effects in case a merger between
substitute components occurs and when n = 2. Because the merging companies’
business operations may be very similar, there may be opportunities to join certain
operations, such as manufacturing or advertising, and reduce costs. Obviously, cost
savings could also be obtained in V mergers, but we focus on the more interesting
case since otherwise the conclusion would be that V merger would be more frequently
proposed and therefore cleared by antitrust authorities.
The price incentives a merged firm faces after a horizontal merger of differentiated
products are of two kinds. The first one is driven by the internalization of competition
23 An upper bound on τ has been considered that ensures that all equilibrium quantities are positive.
Therefore, when we are referring to large enough quality differences this restriction has been considered.
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between the products sold by the new entity and the second accounts for the potential
cost efficiencies derived from the merger. The first effect is positive in the sense that
it implies post-merger price increases, while the second is negative since it works in
the opposite direction. A post-merger increase in prices would be expected only if the
former effect dominates the second.
The price variation index for a composite good market
To evaluate the unilateral effects derived from a merger, we are going to compute the
difference in post and pre-merger equilibrium prices relative to the pre-merger prices
as a function of the diversion ratio24 from firm i to firm j (Di j ) and the pre-merger
Lerner index (Mi ). Obviously, a positive index indicates an increase in prices. In case
efficiencies are present, it is possible to disentangle the effect of the increase in prices
due to the internalization of competition between the merging firms and the effect of
the synergies. The index used allows us to compute the marginal cost reductions (from
merger synergies) required to prevent price increases.25
Take now a post-merger profit function which allows for efficiencies in the form of
synergies affecting marginal costs as follows: πA1 A2 = (p1 − c)(X11 + X12)+ (p2 −
c)(X21+ X22)+ Ec(X11+ X12+ X21+ X22),where E stands for the merger induced
marginal costs savings proportion, where E < 1. Then, we can easily compute the
post-merger equilibrium prices arising from profit maximization accounting for the
effect of synergies and denote them by pHs and q Hs, thus the price of composite
goods is s Hs = pHs + q Hs . We are interested in the post-merger percentage increase
for the composite good price,26 that is s
Hs−s I
s I
. As indicated above, the index is the
sum of two terms, the first is a function of the diversion ratio from components A1 and
A2, denoted by D12, and the pre-merger margin of a single component, denoted by
M; while the second term is the pass-through rate which is a function of the marginal
cost saving measured as a fraction of its price.
Thediversion ratio D12 is defined as the share of sales lost bymerging component A1
that is recaptured by the other component A2, when the price of the former increases,






β+γ , where the demand of component A2 is precisely
X21+ X22 and that of component A1 is X11+ X12.27 Regarding the pre-merger margin
24 The diversion ratio is not such a new concept (see Shapiro (1996) and Werden (1996)). Shapiro (2010a)
defends that economists have measured diversion from one product to another using cross-elasticity of
demand between two products, and agencies have used elasticities to measure “reasonable interchangeabil-
ity”. In fact, it is stated that by 1995, the DOJ was using the term “diversion ratio” to capture this same
concept in a more intuitive way.
25 Among the several indices used to evaluate unilateral effects, the UPPI by Farrell and Shapiro and the
CMCR by Werden and Froeb are the most commonly known. Both essentially coincide in a symmetric
Bertrand model once the UPPI is computed taking the indirect effects into account, that is including the
effect each merging firm’s cost reduction has on the other merging firm’s price.
26 Despite firms select component prices the relevant price is the composite good price and not the com-
ponent price since consumers do not derive any utility from consumption of single components. We will
establish their relationship below.
27 It can be easily shown that in a composite good industry the diversion ratio for the general case with n
components of the same type is − nγ
β+γ (n2−n−1) .
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indexof a single component, M is defined as p
I −c
pI
which is the sameas the one resulting
for the composite good, s
I −2c
s I
, just noting that s I = 2pI by the symmetry considered.
The pre-merger margin index can be expressed as a function of the diversion ratio and





(1+D12)α+c . Finally the price
index that arises is given by














2(3 + D12) .
(5)
Which equals the average of the components’ index. As expected there are two
opposing terms which allows us to find the CMCR, which is the minimum reduction
in the marginal costs as a fraction of the price that ensures a nonincrease of post-
merger prices, that is ε0 = (1 − M)E0 = −M D121+D12 > 0. Therefore, it is concluded
that all E > ε
0
(1−M) implies a decrease in prices after the merger. The threshold ε
0 is
increasing in the pre-merger margin index and in the diversion ratio. As the diversion
ratio is decreasing in the degree of differentiation, a lower synergy would be required
to clear a horizontal merger when composite goods are very differentiated.
Focusing on each component price effects, we have that
pHs − pI
pI
= (2 + D12)
[
−M D12




q Hs − q I
q I









It is interesting to see that the price index for the composite good price is explained
by opposing effects on the different component prices. The horizontal merger has an
upward effect on p’s while there is a downward effect on q’s absent synergies. Also
regarding the pass-through rates the horizontal merger has a negative effect on p’s
while the effect is positive on q’s. Since the effect derived from p’s is a direct effect it
dominates the induced effect on q’s so the price index for the composite good follows
the same pattern than the effect on p’s.
The price variation index for a regular good industry
Now we are interested in finding whether the variation in prices resulting from a
horizontal merger is higher when the market is characterized by composite goods or
by regular goods. In order to make the comparison properly we have to consider the
same utility function as before and also to eliminate the possibility that consumers
choose about components. Thus the representative consumer maximizes utility noting
that only products X11 and X22 will be available. The simplest way to do it is to
assume away compatibility between components of the same type and also consider
that there are only two firms, each producing one component of each type. That is,
firm 1 produces components A1 and B1 while firm 2 produces components A2 and B2,
therefore only two products are sold provided incompatibility, that is X11 and X22, as
required. We solve the model for the pre-merger situation and when both firms 1 and 2
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merge, where of course only hori zontal mergersmake sense. Denote by s¯ I and by s¯ Hs
the equilibrium prices pre-merger and post-mergerwhen efficiencies are resulting after
the merger. Also denote by D¯12 and M¯ the corresponding diversion ratios and initial





Therefore the price variation index corresponding to the regular good industry is




− (1 − M¯)E
2
. (7)
Where ε¯0 ≡ ( 2cE¯0
s¯ I
) = (1 − M¯)E¯0 = −M¯ D¯12
1+D¯12 > 0, which is the CMCR. And it is
concluded that all E > ε¯
0
(1−M¯) implies a decrease in prices after the merger.
28
Comparison between price variation indices
First of all it is important to comment that the diversion ratio for composite goods
is greater (in absolute terms) than that of the regular good industry, D12 > D¯12.
The reason is that an increase in one component price affects two composite goods.
Thus the opportunity cost of that price increase in terms of sales in favor of the other
component of the same type is higher as compared with the regular product market.
Secondly, the price margin ratio for the composite good market is greater than that of
the regular market, M > M¯ . Therefore, four independent firms in a composite good
market have more market power than a duopoly in a regular market. Note that higher
diversion ratios and higher price margin ratios are conditions that tend to increase the
upward pricing pressure after the merger. Thus as products become more substitutes
the pressure on prices increases and this is true for both type of goods.
Thirdly, the following proposition is reached:
Proposition 3 Considering a horizontal merger, the marginal cost saving proportion
required to not increase prices is greater for a composite good industry than the one
required for a regular good industry. In other words, E0 > E¯0.
The above result is useful for antitrust authorities since it advises them to be more
demanding when dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods industries. Note
that this difference is rooted to the higher diversion ratio and margin that arise in
composite good industries.
Finally, to compare the two indices just note that horizontal mergers in composite
good industries are less effective in passing efficiencies derived from the merger to




2 . Also and in case of no realized efficiencies after the merger, that
is for E = 0, an interesting result is that the comparison among both indices is not
univocal and depends on the degree of product differentiation and on the size of the
α
c ratio. In particular, the price index in composite-good industries is greater if and
28 Note that the equality for the case of symmetry in page 9 in Shapiro (2010b) is the same as the expression
7 in the text once we consider the diversion ratio with its sign and not in absolute value. Solving for E, we
find the same expression as Eq. 6 in Werden (1996).
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only if αc >
β+γ
β−γ . A sufficient condition is that the price index in composite-good





This paper studies merging behavior in a composite good industry allowing firms to
choose the type of partner, either a complementary or a substitute component producer.
Previous analysis has focused on just one type of merger and papers on composite
goods have considered only the possibility of complementary mergers. We find that
when the number of firms is relatively low, i.e. less than eleven per component which
implies less than 121 composite goods in the market, vertical mergers arise at equi-
librium only if composite goods are very differentiated, while horizontal mergers are
preferred otherwise. If the number of firms is greater than or equal than this thresh-
old, only vertical mergers arise at equilibrium. In terms of welfare a simple policy
implication is derived: a proposed vertical merger will be always allowed by antitrust
authorities under any standard, either the consumer surplus or the social welfare one,
while a horizontal merger will never be when only strategic effects are taken into
account. Therefore, we identify a market failure since horizontal mergers when pro-
posed are never allowed. This never happens in case a vertical merger is proposed.
Another interesting advise for antitrust authorities is that if they receive notifications
of vertical mergers when products are close substitutes and the number of firms is not
large, they should conclude that some efficiencies are associated to vertical mergers
since they would not otherwise be proposed. Finally, the higher the number of firms in
the market, the stricter the condition for a vertical merger to be approved, under both
standards, Consumer Surplus or Social Welfare. The possibility of a countermerger is
also studied, which will be the response in the industry after a merger. We find that a
similar pattern as in the baseline model, since a second horizontal merger will follow
if the number of firms is not too large and composite goods are good substitutes, while
a vertical one follows when either composite products are very differentiated or when
the number of firms is large. The policy implication remains unaltered. Several robust-
ness checks are carried out under the baseline model when n = 2 to analyze whether
including more producers in only one component, or adding a third component, or
limiting compatibility, or introducing quality differences imply significant changes in
the results. The basic conclusion is that all of these new assumptions are imposing
asymmetries that make important who is the proposer of a merger thus resulting in
interesting scenarios. Basically the baseline model results are not qualitatively altered.
Coming back to policy implications, notice that horizontal mergers are commonly
proposed and usually accepted in case there is no substantial lessening of competition
or the merger is a necessary condition to achieve efficiency gains. Since the isolated
strategic effects do not allow to clear horizontal mergers, we resort to considering effi-
ciency effects linked to horizontal mergers to check the conditions antitrust authorities
should impose to clear them for the case of n = 2. To tackle this issue we consider
a price index to evaluate unilateral effects of a merger which takes into account, on
the one hand, the diversion ratio and the pre-merger margin index and, on the other,
the pass-through rate. We find that both the diversion ratio and the pre-merger margin
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index are greater in a composite good industry, compared to a regular good industry.
Thus, despite being counter intuitive, firms’ market power is greater in a four-firm
composite good industry than in a standard duopoly of a regular good. The pass-
through rate, however, is lower in a composite good industry. An important result is
that the marginal cost saving required for a horizontal merger in order not to increase
prices is greater in a composite good industry than in a regular good one. Antitrust
authorities should request, therefore, higher savings levels in the case of horizontal
mergers in composite good markets.
It will be interesting to study in future research efficiency effects when components
can give some utility to consumers by themselves, not only if they are combined and
used inside a composite good. Moreover, a policy maker can be incorporated to the
model, to study the implications of a policy aimed to make firms reduce post-merger
prices or to subsidize firms involved in desirable mergers for the society.
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Appendix: Equilibrium expressions
Horizontal merger
A1 and A2 producersmerge. Three qualitatively different FOCwill arise bymaking use
of the symmetry in the model, leading to the following three equilibrium component
prices after solving the system:
(i) The price of component A set by the merged firm, pHM (n), where H denotes
horizontal and M identifies the merged firm.
(ii) The price of component A set by the outsiders, pHO (n), where O denotes outsiders.
(iii) The price of component B set by also outsiders to the merger, q HO (n).
FOC’s for outsiders have the same shape as in the initial casewhile those for themerged
firm now incorporates the internalization of competition between component A1 and
A2 resulting in a smaller marginal effect of the component price on total component
demand. That is, for the case of p1 the FOC reads,
∑
∀ j
X1 j = (p1 − c) n
(
β + (n2 − 2n − 1) γ )
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ ) .
The equilibrium component prices follow:
pHM (n) =















Profits for the merged firm, outsiders of the same component type and outsiders of the
other component type are now,
π HM (n) =
2n
(
β + (n2 − 2n − 1) γ ) (pHM (n) − c)2
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ )
π HO A(n) =
n
(
β + (n2 − n − 1) γ ) (pHO (n) − c)2
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ )
π HO B(n) =
n
(
β + (n2 − n − 1) γ ) (q HO (n) − c)2
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ )
Vertical merger
A1 and B1 producers merge. When mixed bundling is considered the new entity will
set three different prices. Those for each component type and another one for the
bundle. Three qualitatively different FOCs will arise by making use of the symmetry
in the model, which lead to the following:
(i) The price of components A1 and B1, pV1 = qV1 = pVM (n), where V refers to
vertical.
(ii) The bundle price, sVb (n).
(iii) The component prices Ai and B j set by outsiders are pVi = qVj = pVO(n) with
i, j = 1.
The equilibrium prices are,
pVM (n) =
(α − 2c)(β − γ )(2β + (2n2 − n − 2)γ )
2(3β2 + (4n2 − 4n − 5)βγ + (n2 − 2n − 1) (n2 − 2) γ 2) + c
sVb (n) =
(α − 2c)(β − γ )(3β + (3n2 − 2n − 3)γ )
2(3β2 + (4n2 − 4n − 5)βγ + (n2 − 2n − 1) (n2 − 2) γ 2) + c
pVO(n) =
(α − 2c)(β − γ )(β + (n2 − n − 1)γ )
3β2 + (4n2 − 4n − 5)βγ + (n2 − 2n − 1) (n2 − 2) γ 2 + c





β+γ (n2−2n+1))(pVM (n)−c)2−4γ (n−1)(sVB (n)−c)(pVM (n)−c)
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ )
πVO (n) = πVO A(n) = πVO B(n) =
n
(
β + (n2 − n − 1) γ ) (pVO (n) − c)2
(β − γ ) (β + (n2 − 1) γ )
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Pure bundling
In case of pure bundling, although there are n×n firms only (n−1)×(n−1) composite
goods plus the bundle can be purchased. Besides, only two different equilibrium prices
are set, the bundle price, denoted by sVpb(n), and the outsiders component prices,
pVpO(n). The expressions for those prices and profits are:
sVpb(n) =
(α − 2c)(β − γ )(3β + (n − 1)(3n − 4)γ )
2(3β2 + (n − 2)(4n − 1)βγ + (n − 1) (n(n − 1)(n − 3) + 1) γ 2) + c
pVpO (n) =
(α − 2c)(β − γ )(2β + (2n(n − 2) + 1)γ )
2(3β2 + (n − 2)(4n − 1)βγ + (n − 1) (n(n − 1)(n − 3) + 1) γ 2) + c
πVpM (n) =
(α − 2c)2(β − γ )(β + n(n − 2)γ )(3β + (n − 1)(3n − 4)γ )
4(β + (n − 1)2γ )(3β2 + (n − 2)(4n − 1)βγ + (n − 1) (n(n − 1)(n − 3) + 1) γ 2)2
πVpO (n) =
(n − 1)(α − 2c)2(β − γ )(β + (n − 1)(n − 2)γ )(2β + (2n(n − 2) + 1)γ )
4(β + (n − 1)2γ )(3β2 + (n − 2)(4n − 1)βγ + (n − 1) (n(n − 1)(n − 3) + 1) γ 2)2
Social Welfare
To compute the expressions for Social Welfare (SW) and Consumer Surplus (CS)
corresponding to each situation we will use a reformulation of the utility function in




∀ j Xi j
)
=
n2X Ii j leading to the following expressions for welfare and consumer surplus:
SW I (n) = n2((α − 2c)X Ii j −
β + (n2 − 1)γ
2
(X Ii j )
2)
C SI (n) = SW I (n) − 2nπ I (n)
Similarly, in the case of a Horizontal merger between the two firms producing com-
ponents A1 and A2, there are two different equilibrium demands those corresponding
to the composite goods formed with components produced by the merger, denoted by







∀ j Xi j
)
= n(2X HM + (n − 2)X HO A). Social welfare and Consumer
surplus read,
SW H (n) = n((α − 2c)
(
2X HM + (n − 2)X HO A
)


















C SH (n) = SW H (n) − π HM (n) − (n − 2)π HO A − nπ HO B
Finally, for the case of a Vertical merger there are three different equilibrium demands:
the one corresponding to the bundle sold by the merger, denoted by X Vb , that corre-
sponding to composite goods sold by the merger, denoted by X VM , and the one cor-
responding to the composite goods sold by outsiders, denoted by X VO . Notice that
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now the sum of demands for each component of type A differs depending on whether
it is the one produced by the new firm,
∑
∀ j X1 j = X Vb + (n − 1)X VM or those
produced by outsiders,
∑
∀ j Xi j = X VM + (n − 1)X VO ,∀i = 1. Adding for all i ,∑
∀i
(∑
∀ j Xi j
)
= X Vb + 2(n − 1)X VM + (n − 1)2X VO . Social welfare and Consumer
surplus read,
SW V (n) = (α − 2c)
(
X Vb + 2(n − 1)X VM + (n − 1)2X VO
)




)2 + 2(n − 1)
(
X VM







X Vb + 2(n − 1)X VM + (n − 1)2X VO
)2
C SV (n) = SW V (n) − πVM (n) − 2(n − 1)πVO (n)
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